The STRATUS project seeks to provide resilience against cyber threats to distributed systems. STRATUS is designed to anticipate, diagnose, and respond proactively to threats. It uses a reactive technique to respond to the latest events quickly and a more 'strategic' technique that recognizes attack plans and responds to them proactively. We focus on a set of experiments where we approximate the behavior of STRATUS in order to evaluate its responses given a variety of missions and attacks. We show the relative merits of responding to threats using local, reactive responses versus strategically ones and present evidence that justifies combining the two approaches to system defense.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defending cloud computing resources against cyber attacks once exterior defenses have been breached can be extremely difficult given, among other things, the uniformity of the underlying systems environment. We have been developing STRATUS as part of a larger program that is looking at how cloud-based distributed system resilience can be enhanced through new hardware and software approaches. STRATUS focuses on improving resilience by quietly managing distributed process communications channels, introducing redundant processes when systems are threatened, and removing or fishbowling compromised components. It combines a tactical approach and a strategic approach to identifying threats and selecting responses. The tactical approach models threats as contagious and distrusts neighboring processes, e.g. processes that communicate with one another, accordingly. The strategic approach anticipates threats to mission related processes and recognizes attack plans as they unfold in order to anticpate how to deploy defenses. In this paper we briefly describe STRATUS' approach to tactical and strategic defense and discuss a series of experiments using a simulation of STRATUS' behavior against generated attacks to evaluate and refine our approach.
II. STRATUS DESCRIPTION
STRATUS (see [1] for full details of the functioning of the STRATUS system) is designed to work in an anticipated future environment where hardware, OS, and VM improvements in cloud clusters provide process isolation within a given host. Despite those improvements, attacks can still succeed if the attacker knows how to utilize application-specific distributed communication pathways to insert exploitive payloads. Such attacks require knowledge of the application systems involved as well as specific plans to target them. STRATUS tries to provide mission-level resilience despite such attacks by using modest computational overhead to diagnose attacks, switch rapidly to computed backup contingencies, and predict downstream events in order to make mission critical functions resilient to those attacks. Figure 1 provides an overview of STRATUS' functional organization. STRATUS assumes a suite of anomaly detection sensors is deployed in the mission-level interprocess communications network managed by its distributed object-oriented communications infrastructure, CSE (Communications Security Enforcement). Sensor reports of process failure, disruption, anomalous communications, etc. are analyzed and fused into hypotheses about the most likely attack events (such as an attack from one compromised component on another) that would produce those reports. CSE is responsible for implementing changes specified by STRATUS to the communication channels between components, and starting and stopping processes. It may, if STRATUS determines components have been compromised, isolate those components in 'fishbowls' where all of their communications are redirected to special fishbowl manager components where their messages can be monitored while simultaneously denying them access to the active system elements.
STRATUS' tactical analysis uses the hypothesized attack events to determine the most likely attack sources and next targets. Possible targets are either adjacency over communication channels or co-residence on a host. Once an attack is considered to have occurred at a node, attack sources may be determined by a diagnosis strategy that can use weak evidence of anomalous behaviors on paths from the network edge to the attacked components. Both attack sources and possible targets become less trustworthy, as they may respectively be or become compromised and need to be replaced. The main methods of responding to such events are to shut off communications from compromised components and to start backup processes that can then be used to quickly replace components when evidence that they are compromised increases.
STRATUS' strategic threat analysis is based on the identification of the most likely attack plans from a wide set of possible attacks that were generated by the system in advance. STRATUS' attack plan recognition system identifies the most likely attack plans based on the event hypotheses derived from observation evidence and, when it can do so before the expected target is reached, those attacks can be thwarted using the same kinds of responses: channel reconfiguration, the replacement of processes by backups, and the shutdown or fishbowling of compromised components.
The difference between the two defenses is roughly that the tactical model tries to back up as many neighbors of corrupted components as it can given available resources, while the strategic defense tries to anticipate where the attack plan is going in order to get ahead of the attack and uses spare resourses to defend those elements. The tradeoffs between these approaches arise from the partial observability of attacks and the resulting uncertainty in the conclusions derived, especially in large, densely connected networks. Our goal in this study is to explore tradeoffs between the approaches given limited reserve resources, so that we use each where it is most effective.
III. SIMULATOR DESCRIPTION
The simulator serves as an efficient way of approximating performance results for the STRATUS system. The simulator is implemented as an abstract model of the entire STRATUS system; it simulates the mission components and their communications pathways in the CSE channel network, the mission tasks being performed, and the attack plans and attack actions unfolding over time. STRATUS' defensive responses to attacks are interleaved with the attacks themselves.
The simulator first generates a random mission and network model. It builds attack plans against that mission and network, and when it executes, interleaving attack actions and then defensive responses, the attack actions are successful if they haven't been blocked by prior defensive actions, and sometimes cycles occur. STRATUS is given 'observations' of the attack events with a some probability and these observations are used to develop STRATUS' belief state.
While components in the real STRATUS network can have a wide variety of states, there are only five main ones: live, shutdown, compromised, backup, and fishbowled. A live component performs its tasks and may be compromised. Compromised components can broadcast infectious data through the network along the CSE channels that connect it to other functionally related components. A component in the backup state (started but not transmitting data) may be transitioned to live, but this process takes time (a delay of one time step). Finally, a fishbowled component, (which would be placed in that state because STRATUS believes it is compromised) is disconnected from the other live components but its communications (to a special receiver) continue and are monitored. It has no further impact. Mission Model represents the task to be achieved by the network. For simplicity, each component only does one task, which may involve subtasks which require it to request and receive results from subtask components. The task is modeled as an AND-OR tree [2, pg. 435 ]. Tasks at AND nodes can only be achieved if all child-tasks of the AND node are accomplished. OR-nodes only require that some child succeed to succeed themselves. Tasks in the network are never really permanently achieved, but must instead be sustained for the duration of the mission. If a component is compromised after the task is achieved, that task must be re-run. The relationship between tasks causes failure in one part of the network to cascade to other areas, even when the attacker does not directly target those other nodes, modeling that the output from one objective typically serves as input to another task down the line. Attack Model describes various forms of attack against the mission and its underlying network. We consider both point-to-point attacks, which attempt to compro-mise a single node in the network by infecting a shortest path through other nodes in order to reach it, as well as flooding attacks which attempt to bring down every node in the network by means of contagion. Defense Model Builds tactical, strategic, and combinations of tactical and strategic defense plans from beliefs about the current state of the network and mission. We discuss each of these in further detail below.
A. Modeling Belief States
To mount a reasonable defense of the modeled network and mission, the simulator must maintain an internal model of the possible states of network nodes and ongoing attacks. We refer to this belief about the state of the network and attack as the belief state of the system. In STRATUS itself, this is called the trust model which is a qualitative uncertainty model. For simplicity, the simulator's partially correct beliefs are formed by introducing weighted random noise over the actual simulated world state and independently randomly making only some events observable.
Constructing a belief state for STRATUS from simulated "ground truth" requires that we introduce noise over two aspects of the belief: the state of nodes in the network and the ongoing attack. The latter only affects the strategic defense. The belief state for the network consists of a belief about whether each node is compromised or not (true or false). For every node in the network, we throw a weighted coin to decide whether to report the true state of the node or the opposite of its current state.
The contagion model used in STRATUS infers additional information about compromised nodes from an observed infection event. When it sees that a given node has been infected, it infers with lower certainty that it's neighbors are also infected. In the current simulator, we do not model this belief explicitly, but the tactical defense acts to protect the neighbors of infected nodes, up to its resource budget, by giving the backups, which is much the same as the practical effect of STRATUS' contagion model of belief.
The simulator also throws a weighted coin to decide which attack is occurring, 1 so that its approximation of the strategic defense can operate. Again, if it is heads, it is given a belief that the actual attack is occurring, and if tails, then it believes some other (randomly chosen) attack is occurring. No attack is one possibility.
B. Defense Models
The defense models are different approaches to responding to beliefs about the current state of the simulated mission, either by planning a response to expected attack actions several steps into the future (the strategic defense model) or by computing a response directly to corruption in the current believed state of the network, with minimal consideration of future states (the tactical defense model). The combined defense combines these two approaches to network defense. Tactical Defense: The tactical model constructs a set of actions that will bring damaged elements of the network into a state where the current compute mission could be completed (the components needed for all unfinished task elements are operating normally). STRATUS' defensive actions are: restarting crashed components, fishbowling or shutting down and perhaps restarting corrupted components, and stationing backup components around the network so if the components that are backed up are subsequently compromised, they can more quickly be returned to a normal operating state. The reactive defense only addresses nodes that it believes are infected, not those that actually are, which it cannot know. For each node believed to be infected, it determines if there are sufficient resources available to fishbowl it. If so, it fishbowls the node and leaves it running. If not, it activates an existing backup or just kills and restarts it. In addition, if enough resources are available, it creates backups for the neighbors of those nodes so that they can be restarted more quickly, approximating the STRATUS notion of contagion of distrust, where, if enough evidence has accumulated that neighboring nodes might be corrupted because its neighbors are, it treats them as also corrupted. Strategic Defense: In STRATUS, the strategic defense mechanisms only apply when it has a strong belief that a particular attack is correctly identified, in which case it uses its defenses to ensure that the path to the node that is the attacker's goal is well backed up and channels from known infections on that path are disconnected from those goals. The current simulator emulates the strategic defense somewhat less accurately. With probability equal to the experimental variable model accuracy it believes the attack is the one that is actually occuring. Otherwise, it believes it is another randomly chosen attack.
Its defense against whatever attack it believes is occurring is constructed by seaching for the plan that maximizes the utility of the given mission, given that the remaining steps in the attack occur in the future. It does this using anytime tree search [3] . From an initial network configuration, the strategic defense planner simulates the network (including an attack) going forward to some fixed time cutoff, or until the mission is completed. The utility of each resulting plan is calculated and the one with highest utility is the new strategic defense plan. These plans typically consist of restarts and fishbowling of nodes along the attack plan pathway, as opposed to the reactive model, which focuses on backing up nodes adjacent to an attack. Combined Defense: The combined defense is a combination of the strategic and tactical defense models. At a high level, the combined defense computes both the tactical and strategic defenses, taking the actions from both where those actions don't conflict with one another. In the case of a conflict, the strategic actions are preferred over the tactical actions, given available resources, so we might think of the combined defense as a strategic defense supplemented by further actions suggested by the tactical defense.
Combining the two approaches to defense can be quite beneficial, as we will see in the experimental evaluation. One of the purposes of the current set of experiments is to determine which model is better when, and determine the right way to combine the two.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We now explore the performance of parts of the simulated STRATUS system with our monte-carlo experiments. In particular, we investigate the differences between the tactical, strategic, and combined defenses of the network. We then conclude with implications for the overall STRATUS project.
The experiments contrast the two forms of defense available in the simulator: a planning based strategic defense model, and the more rule-oriented tactical defense model, and also look at some the combinations of these. The comparisons are done along two dimensions: the impact of various levels of resource over-provisioning on each defense and the impact of belief accuracy on the effectiveness of the defenses. We conducted our investigation on randomly generated networks which have, on average, just over two hundred components. Simulations run for 500 time steps, and take around 5 seconds to complete per run. Performance vs. Provisioned Factor: Consider the behavior of the two defenses as a function of the number of resources assigned to the network (Figure 2 ). In the figure, the x-axis represents the amount of resources allocated to the network as a factor of the number of nodes in the network. So a network that has one resource for each node in the network has a provisioned factor of 1, while a network with a provisioned factor of 2 could backup every node in the network.
The y-axis shows the performance of the defenses relative to the performance of the mission when no attack is conducted. We do this for two reasons: it provides an upper bound on the performance of the system and it makes the performance of defenses comparable across instances. The score achieved by a simulation is dependent, in part, on the number of nodes in a network. By normalizing scores to a theoretical maximum score for the instance, we make comparison across instances of differing sizes possible. Performance is measured as the sum of the utilities of completed tasks across the duration of a simulation. The lines show the mean performance of one hundred random samples of the given defense technique, while the error bars show 95% confidence intervals about the mean.
In Figure 2 , the strategic defense model is represented by a green dashed line, the tactical model is shown using a solid red line, and the combined approach is shown using a dotted blue line. There is no one approach to mission defense that dominates the other two. Each performs better under some level of provisioning. For the least provisioned networks, the strategic defense has the best performance. Once we pass a provisioned factor of about 1.5, the combined defense begins to have better performance than either the strategic or tactical defense alone. Finally, for extremely well provisioned networks, we see that the tactical defense has better performance.
The fact that the strategic defense alone performs better than the combined defense for networks with few resources (provisioned factors between 1 and 1.5) can be explained by several things. First, for a given model accuracy (the figure shows runs at 0.9) the strategic model performs approximately evenly well at different provisioning levels because when it has the correct belief about the attack it can stop it. The pattern is similar at other levels of accuracy down to 0.5, when noise dominates. The tactical defense does well with higher provisioning because it can back up the whole network. The combined defense does the best between factors of 1.5 and 3.5, when there are enough resources to do both defenses most of the time.
One might naturally expect that the combined defense would provide the better of strategic and tactical defense performance, but as we see in Figure 2 , the combined defense is often better than either of its components alone. This is likely because of the differing goals of the strategic and tactical defense. The strategic defense is interested in defeating predicted attacks, while the tactical defense is concerned with protecting mission performance in the immediate sense. Thus, the tactical defense will consider actions which the strategic won't, namely having multiple live versions of resources when provisions allow. Thus, the combined defense will attempt to drive attacks out of the network while trying to keep as much of the mission going as possible. The tactical defense model does eventually dominate the other defense models when it has a large number of resources. One might suspect that a provisioning factor of 2 is sufficient for perfect performance (one live, one backup), however timing interactions in the model lead to requiring more resources for perfect reliability. The imperfect combination of defenses hinders the combined defense model in an extreme case. Performance v. Observation Probability: Figure 3 considers the performance of the two defensive approaches along our other axis of control: belief accuracy. A model accuracy of 1 means that we always report the true state of the network to the defense, whereas a model accuracy of 0.5 is just noise. As before, the y-axis shows how effective the defense was, relative to the same network not under attack. Figure 3 shows that the strategic defense requires an accurate representation of the state of the world in order for its planned defense to be effective. In other words, if its belief about which attack is occurring is wrong, the defense won't work. Planning to thwart anticipated events is an effective technique when you can effectively reason about future states of the network from the current state. The simulator is not doing that reasoning, it is just being handed a possibly innacurate model. In the real STRATUS, the strategic defense is only used when there is high certainty what the attack plan is (usually after many observations) and when there is still an effective defense available. Our next planned set of experiments will model the strategic defense applicability criteria more closely, especially in how it is used in the combined defense.
Nonetheless, the current experiments indicate that the combined defense can have better performance than the strategic alone because sometime the tactical defense covers the attack, or parts of it. However, when there are plentiful resources to use, the available information about the attack is poor, the tactical defense dominates. When the combined defense falters it may be because it is strictly preferring the strategic defense even when it only has poor information and limited resources. Leading the Attack: Our final experiment looks only at the behavior of strategic defenses given different styles of attacks. The strategic (and therefore the combined) defense requires that STRATUS predict and defend against the next several steps of an ongoing attack, which we refer to as leading an attack. Leading the attack is trying to predict, given the currently compromised nodes (and therefore an expectation about what will be attacked in the next few steps) which nodes are likely to be compromised next or soon. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate that the way in which we lead the attack needs to align with the kind of attack itself, where we are distinguishing spreading attacks and linear, targeted attacks. Both can be used to achieve similar goals, but depending on the available resources, spreading attacks If we have a model of the kind of ongoing attack and sufficient resources, leading the attack is easy. We know which next events to block. In the event that we have no such model, or do not trust the model that we have, we have to lead the attack solely from the state of the network, as the reactive defense does, which means we may not be able to "lead" far enough in advance.
The experiment considers two methods of leading the attack, defending against one node, selected at random from uncorrupted nodes in the attack plan that are adjacent to the most recently corrupted node assuming it is going to be attacked next, or defending all such nodes adjacent to the most recently corrupted node are going to be attacked next. We refer to these as the conservative and aggressive leads respectively. The figures show that, for the flooding attack, the aggressive lead has performance that dominates the conservative lead, while for the point-to-point attack, we observe exactly the opposite. So long as the prediction matches the actual attack, performance improves.
V. CONCLUSION
We investigated the relative merits of the two techniques for responding to cyber threats that are being developed in the STRATUS project using an abstract simulation of STRATUS that we could run quickly with large randomized problems under a variety of configurations. The experiments show that the amount of additional extra resources, the accuracy of the models of network corruption and the accuracy of the prediction of what attack is ongoing, all play roles in determining the effectiveness of the defenses that variously rely on those models.
Specifically, we saw that the accuracy of the system's beliefs about the attack was the determining factor in the effectiveness of strategic defense. Resource provisioning also plays a key role in defending the mission, and given the amount of time it takes to clean out and bring an infected machine back on line, we actually need far more resources for a completely reliable system than we might first expect. We may also need to be able to recognize the kind of attack as well as the target. Overall, we showed that the reactive defense tends to have better performance when system beliefs are uncertain and when resources are plentiful, that the strategic defense can make more efficient use of resources so long as its model of the attack is accurate, and that explicitly leading an attack has better performance than relying on the contagion model alone.
Our goal in doing these experiments was to gain insight into the tradeoffs between them, so that the real STRATUS system, which uses both kinds of defense, can combine them most effectively. We found that reactive plans for network repair when combined with strategic plans to defend against identified attacks can do better than each method individually, and that no one method dominated another in all cases, strengthening our belief that both need to be used in tandem, but at the appropriate times. A combination of the two seems to do best when approximately double the minimum resources are available. These experimental results will inform our development of a decision procedure for when to use which of the two defenses investigated and suggest a number of future directions to explore in both refining the experiments and improving the STRATUS system.
